Amir JAfarzadeh; Abbas Shakeri; Farshad Momeni; Ghahreman Abdoli
Volume 3, Issue 12 , October 2014, , Pages 144-177
Abstract
Following paper explores Iran & Turkmenistan's behavior in exporting natural gas to Europe. Taking this matter these two countries can be a potential of gas exporter to Europe. By using a framework of cooperative game theory, coalition among natural gas exporters and transmitters for the Nabucco ...
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Following paper explores Iran & Turkmenistan's behavior in exporting natural gas to Europe. Taking this matter these two countries can be a potential of gas exporter to Europe. By using a framework of cooperative game theory, coalition among natural gas exporters and transmitters for the Nabucco Project has been explored. In this paper we answer the question whether the two countries should go to the coalition for exporting gas to Europe or not. Moreover, we calculate bargaining power of these two countries. By having outcomes of following paper one can conclude that the both countries have profits to make the coalition for gas exporting among the Nabucoo project. Iran has more bargaining power than Turkmenistan so Iran can play important and active role to make a coalition to export gas to Europe among the Nabucco project.
Ghahraman Abdoli; Pejman Amidi
Volume 1, Issue 4 , October 2012, , Pages 117-144
Abstract
This paper considers the impact of the establishment of a gas cartel on extraction of this exhaustible resource. A simple intertemporal extraction model suggests a linear extraction rule with slope term common when discount rates are homogenous and differences in pricing behavior and costs determine ...
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This paper considers the impact of the establishment of a gas cartel on extraction of this exhaustible resource. A simple intertemporal extraction model suggests a linear extraction rule with slope term common when discount rates are homogenous and differences in pricing behavior and costs determine the intercept. As a result of comparing the amount of extraction in various market structures, we find out that when the market structure changes from competitive form to Stackelberg leader game, the amount of extraction decreases. Panel data regression exhibits a robust and stable linear extraction-reserves relationship and a significantly lower estimated slope within the countries with larger amounts of reserves. Moreover, this finding may be explained by the differences in discount rates.
